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Indians have studied Westerners since the rise ofthe British in India over 250 years ago.  Fromthat time until Indian independence in 1947,
children of the Indian elite often had a British
governess followed by a university education in the
UK. Today about 94,000 Indians are enrolled in US
colleges and universities, constituting the largest
group of foreign students in that country. Even
those who remain to study in India are exposed to
English literature classics and American business
books and case studies.
In contrast, Westerners do not attempt to
understand Indians and Indian business to a similar
degree. For one thing, there is substantially less
business literature about India as compared to the
other two Asian powers, China and Japan. And there
is a subtle reason that most people fail to view
Indian business practices as unique and therefore
worthy of careful study: Indians are proficient in
adopting dual identities. When Indians encounter
foreigners, especially Westerners, they adopt
markers of global identity in dress, food, and even
consumption of cultural products; yet their Indian
identity is never abandoned. When they return to
interacting with other Indians and at home, they
revert to their own dress, eat Indian food and use
local cultural products. For example, 96 per cent of
all music consumed in India is domestically
produced, Hollywood movies can barely get an
audience against those of Bollywood, and women
overwhelmingly dress in Indian fashions.
Duality of Indian culture
This concept of duality has a long history in India.
The industrial revolution brought to India by the
British forced workers to behave against their cultural
norms. People moved to factories in urban centres,
requiring them to work alongside members of other
castes. At the factories, different castes mixed
relatively freely, ate at the same cafeterias, travelled
in the same buses and attended political rallies with
one another. Brahmins and other upper castes had
even begun working in jobs considered highly
polluting – for example, the tanning of skins and
hides. However, there was no conflict between the
work of upper castes in industry and their obligations
as good Hindus, because the factory and home
environments were separate spheres with different
standards of conduct and behaviour. For example,
Indians used Western dress, spoke English and
followed Western customs in the workplace, while 
at home they used Indian dress, spoke the local
language and conducted themselves as good Hindus.
This compartmentalization, as it is sometimes
called, allows Indians to be highly adaptable. 
This adaptability has ancient roots and may grow
from the uniquely Indian ability to separate what in
Hinduism is known as “karma” (or work) and “tatva”
(or essence), one’s own individuality. It allowed
Indian workers to adapt from caste-oriented village
life to the relatively caste-blind factory floor. It
allows them today to thrive in all kinds of unfamiliar
professional global environments even as they
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reconstruct and preserve the Indian microcosm
culturally and socially. Most Indians can comfortably
exist with seemingly contradictory worlds and ideas
at the same time. Perhaps it even gives them a
competitive advantage to live and flourish in a world
of religious, cultural and ethnic diversity.
Foreigners need to be aware that Indians are very
good at adopting a dual identity. The Indian
businesspeople that foreigners encounter seem
almost Western in their outlook, at least relative to
Chinese or Japanese executives. The fluency with
which Indians speak English, combined with their
familiarity with the West and its concepts, can lull
Westerners into believing that Indians are quite like
them. But Indians, despite their apparent Western
business outlook, do have some distinct approaches
to business.
Given the rise of global business, non-Indians will
increasingly face Indians as customers, competitors
and collaborators. It is useful to understand that
collaboration between foreign and Indian companies
has some unique aspects.
Indians as collaborators
Indians as collaborators play two roles vis-à-vis
foreign companies, first as joint-venture partners and,
more recently, as acquirers of foreign companies.
These two roles are distinct.
Indians as joint-venture partners
Although international companies are seeking to
break into the Indian market through joint ventures
with Indian firms, India can be regarded as the
joint-venture graveyard of the world, based on
evidence of the past two decades. One of the largest
business houses in India, which at one time boasted
that it managed 15 joint ventures with Fortune
1000 companies, now has no surviving joint
venture. A McKinsey study found that, of the 25
major joint ventures between foreign and Indian
companies established from 1993 to 2003, only
three still survived in 2005. For example, consider
Modicorp, which during the 1990s had lined up
alliances with Motorola, Walt Disney and Xerox –
leading to references to its chairman, B.K. Modi, as
“Mr. JV”. Since then, about a dozen of his joint
ventures, including those with the three American
companies mentioned, have dissolved.
Why have Indians failed as collaborators in joint
ventures with foreign partners in India? The problem
was that, before 1991, joint ventures were
mandatory for foreign companies seeking to enter
India. Even today, after liberalization, many of the
large and fast-growing sectors of the economy, such
as retailing, consumer banking, telecommunications
and media, require an Indian partner. Thus foreign
partners enter into these joint ventures without
really desiring an Indian partner but forced to have
one for market access. Often the Indian partner has
few industry-specific competencies to contribute
beyond local knowledge, as was the case with
Tesco’s retailing alliance with the Tata Group and
Wal-Mart’s with Bharti.
In contrast, the Indian partners believe they have
substantive contributions to make to the joint
ventures, high expectations of contributions from
the foreign partners, and disproportionate power in
the relationship because local laws have tipped the
scales in their favour. The result is a significant
mismatch in expectations between the two partners
and, as might be anticipated, a subsequent falling
out between the partners.
Unlike companies in neighbouring regions such
as the Middle East or Southeast Asia, Indian
partners are not interested in playing passive roles
as investors in their joint ventures. They prefer to
have at least a 50 per cent holding and, in most
cases, prefer a controlling interest. In addition, their
expectations of the major multinational corporations
that are usually their foreign partners are high.
Specifically, they feel that foreign partners should:
● Be relatively non-interfering
● Freely share their distinctive and superior
expertise with respect to processes, systems and
technology
● Be willing to train Indian joint-venture executives
and accept that these executives may be
transferred to other companies that are wholly
owned by the Indian partner
● Provide a strong reference if the Indian partner
needs to raise funds for other ventures
● Direct business to the joint-venture company from
their operations in other countries and, if
possible, from their customers as well
While one can argue about how reasonable these
expectations are, the problem is usually not in the
expectations themselves. The McKinsey study
reasoned that most of the joint ventures ran into
trouble because the Indian partners were unable to
invest enough to expand the business quickly and
match the ambitions of the foreign partners. This is
not a uniquely Indian problem, as it occurs frequently
in the developing world in joint ventures between
large multinational corporations and relatively small
local investors. One solution may be to allow the
foreign partner to increase its stake in the joint
venture in return for disproportionately funding its
growth. Yet, this is often a problem because the
Indian investor is either unable to dilute its share for
legal reasons (it may be required by law to maintain a
minimum equity participation) or is unwilling to do so.
Since the economic liberalization of the early
1990s, the Indian government has gradually
allowed foreign companies to operate alone or
























increase their stake in many industries. As a result,
a large number of Indian joint ventures have lost
their reason for existence from the foreign partners’
perspective. They either wish to buy out the Indian
partner or set up an independent unit separate from
the existing joint venture. This part of the joint
venture story in India has been rather unpleasant.
Almost always, the foreign partner is in a hurry to
exit, and the Indian partner finds itself with an
exceptionally good negotiating hand. Valuation of
exit pricing on a scale of 1:5 is not unusual,
depending upon whether the foreign partner desires
to sell (receives 20 cents on the dollar) or buy (pays
several times market value).
For example, when the Indian government eased
restrictions for foreign companies in investment
banking, both Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch
looked to exit their existing joint ventures with
Indian partners. Goldman Sachs sold its stake in its
successful joint venture with Kotak Mahindra Bank
Ltd. for about $75 million, while Merrill Lynch
bought most of its stake in DSP Merrill Lynch for
about $500 million.
If, instead of exiting, the foreign firm wants to set
up an independent unit in the same business as the
joint venture, the Indian government requires the
foreign company to first obtain a “no-objection”
certificate from its local partner. As one can imagine,
the term “same business” is open to multiple
interpretations and often leads to considerable
conflict between partners. For example, in 2006,
Danone faced resistance from the Wadia Group, its
Indian joint-venture partner in the cookie maker
Britannia Industries Ltd. Britannia is 25 per cent
owned by the Wadia family and 25 per cent owned
by the Danone Group, with the rest publicly held.
Danone wanted to exit the joint venture and set up
its own wholly owned operations, in order to pursue
larger dairy and water opportunities. The Wadia
Group took Danone to court in order to stop Danone
from investing in another Indian company. Although
Danone had a no-objection certificate from the
Wadias in 1996, the government felt that it was too
old and asked Danone to obtain a new one. After
acrimonious negotiations and lawsuits between the
two parties, in 2008 Danone agreed to sell its stake
to the Wadias.
Given the poor track record of partnerships, some
foreign companies are reluctant to invest in India.
One India-based financial consultant was quoted in
the Wall Street Journal: “Anyone who gets into a
joint venture in India should assume it will fail and
be comfortable with the terms of what happens
when it does fail.” As a result, recent foreign
entrants that must still pursue the Indian market
through joint ventures, due to restrictive government
policies, realize that these marriages are not made
in heaven. Detailed separation clauses are now part
of the joint-venture agreement.
Overall, India is rapidly moving away from the era
of joint ventures. Bayer, Gillette, Goodyear,
Datacraft, EMI, Sprint, Suzuki, Merrill Lynch, Xerox,
Vodafone and many more have exited their Indian
joint ventures with the sole purpose of reappearing
with 100 per cent-owned companies. While the
days of joint ventures in India may be mostly over,
the era of Indian companies forming joint ventures
outside India is just starting. However, it is still too
early to draw any conclusions about Indians as
collaborators on this front.
Indians as acquirers
There are two major differences in the storyline for
Indians as acquirers of foreign companies compared
to Indians as joint-venture partners. First, foreign
acquisitions by Indian firms are still a relatively
recent phenomenon. Indian companies have been
doing deals outside their borders in any significant
manner only since 2000. In contrast, Indians have
been playing the role of joint-venture partners of
multinational companies since India’s independence
in 1947. Thus the conclusions drawn here about
Indians as acquirers will be more tentative.
Second, despite this short history, research
indicates that Indian companies as acquirers is a
very positive story overall. In fact, Indians have been
rather skilful with their acquisitions. Despite some
Western fears (especially prominent in the Arcelor
takeover and Tata’s battle with Orient-Express
Hotels) about Indians as the “barbarians at the
gate,” Indian companies for the most part have not
sought to destabilize acquired companies
unnecessarily, either in the acquisition process or
the integration process.
























When Indians encounter foreigners, especially Westerners,
they adopt markers of global identity in dress, food, and
even consumption of cultural products; yet their Indian
identity is never abandoned.
Perhaps one reason for the success of Indian
firms in acquisitions is that Indian executives and
companies learn to operate in a challenging
business environment as well as to negotiate within
a diverse, democratic society. Managing a business
in Maharashtra, with its relatively business-friendly
state government, is rather different from managing
a business in West Bengal, with the Communist
Party of India Marxist (CPIM) in power, versus
managing a business in Bihar, India’s most lawless
state with a relatively greater proportion of
convicted criminals represented in the state
legislature. Every large Indian company conducts
business in all of these states, so executives
become masters at managing the context. The
lessons learned in India hold them in good stead
when acquiring foreign companies.
Given that laws in India are not sympathetic to
hostile takeovers, Indian firms until now have
sought to make global acquisitions in a soft manner,
after obtaining the buy-in of the potential target
firm’s management. Whether this practice will
continue as Indian companies grow more ambitious
is hard to predict, but the Arcelor-Mittal deal
indicates that some hostile takeovers will be
necessary despite Indian firms’ predisposition to
eschew aggressive takeover tactics. However,
probably to smooth over the ruffled feathers, the
company is now called ArcelorMittal.
One highly visible change in Indian firms is their
transformation from low-price bidders for distressed
assets to buyers that pay competitive global market
prices for top-quality, strategically complementary
foreign assets. Indian companies, relative to their
size, are willing and able to make large acquisitions.
Consider Tata Tea’s acquisition of Tetley, a company
three times its size; Tata Steel’s takeover of the larger
Corus; or Hindalco’s purchase of Novelis after taking
on significant debt. Indians are very entrepreneurial
and demonstrate an enormous appetite for risk.
Furthermore, the conglomerate model of the large
Indian business houses allows them to use the
assets of the entire family of companies within the
group rather than be restricted to the resources or
leverage of any individual company.
Some clear patterns are visible with respect to
the types of acquisitions to which Indian firms seem
to gravitate in foreign markets. With the significant
exception of Mittal Steel’s emerging market strategy,
most Indian companies are seeking foreign
acquisitions that bring complementary competencies.
The foreign acquisitions help obtain brands that
resonate with Western consumers (for example,
Carlton luggage by VIP or Tetley by Tata Tea), obtain
access to foreign distribution networks or customers
(for example, Dana’s UK operation by Bharat Forge
or various European acquisitions by Ranbaxy),
extend the product portfolio to higher-priced and
more sophisticated products (for example, Arcelor
by Mittal or Novelis by Hindalco), or add significant
R&D capabilities (for example, Hansen and
REpower by Suzlon).
In terms of the integration process, Indian
companies know from their domestic operations
about the importance of other stakeholders,
especially the government and trade unions. India
has strong unions as well as influential politicians
and bureaucrats. While wailing against them may be
a particular sport among Indian executives, they do
realize that these stakeholders play a crucial role in
the success of any business. Thus Indian companies
tend to have a non-confrontational approach toward
local governments and trade unions.
Indians often complain that foreign companies in
India sometimes use expatriates who do not
understand the local context. In my own research, I
saw that when Indian firms make acquisitions, they
are aware of the superior local knowledge of the
management talent and tend to retain them in the
acquired venture. Some observers, such as S.
Mahalingham, CFO of TCS, believe that because
Indian companies lack significant experience with
global acquisitions, they have taken a rather
tentative view on how to deal with the acquired
organization. The philosophy seems to be, “Don’t
rock the boat till you are sure.” TCS during the last
three years has acquired some 20 small and
midsize IT services and consulting companies in the
United Kingdom, Continental Europe, United States
and Australia. TCS has apparently followed a
strategy similar to that of most Indian companies in
that they have left the senior executives and
management structure intact. They have used
Indian managers with significant global exposure to
work as an organizational and cultural bridge
between TCS and the acquired companies.
























Nirmalya Kumar: Inside the powerhouse
Santrupt Misra, Director of Human Resources at
Aditya Birla Group, believes that the management of
companies acquired by Indians has been left in place
primarily for three reasons. First is unfamiliarity with
the local regulatory environment, local politicians
and cultural nuances. Second, these acquisitions
have come at a time when India is booming, and
getting top Indian executives to move to developed
countries is difficult as they perceive their standard of
living would decline with the expatriate assignment.
Third, companies need to demonstrate cultural
diversity. Since the top management in India is
usually Indian, leaving the acquired foreign firm’s
top executives in place enhances the diversity ratio.
In the future, the practice of leaving top
management in place may change. One factor
driving this is that Indian firms have paid dearly for
their acquisitions in developed markets and need to
recover this investment by imposing higher growth
targets on the acquired firms. Unfortunately, managers
whose experience is in the developed world are used
to performing, and being satisfied with, annual
growth targets of two to five per cent. It is hard to
convince them to accept more ambitious goals. In
contrast, Indian executives have regularly responded
with double-digit growth over the past decade, given
the boom in the economy. As a result, as Misra
observed: “You start thinking, ‘Should I struggle to
convince the local manager to accept the higher
growth target or send one of my Indian managers?’”
Making costly acquisitions at the top of the
business cycle, funded primarily by debt, can tempt
the acquirers to set unrealistically high targets on
the acquired firm. When the current liquidity crisis
is added to this mix, it portends a challenging time
ahead for Indian firms that have completed large
acquisitions between 2005 and 2007.
Indian companies have been slower in
incorporating top management from acquired
companies into their own structures in India. Tata is
further ahead in this process than other Indian
companies. Seven years after the Tetley acquisition,
the head of Tetley sits on the board of Tata Tea, and
Tata Tea’s R&D centre head in India is a Tetley
scientist. More than half of the boards of TCS and
Tata Steel are non-Indians.
Indian experience in foreign acquisitions is recent
and still evolving. Regardless of which role an
Indian company is playing, soft relationship factors
and symbolic gestures are important to Indians,
especially when negotiating with Westerners. As a
former colonized power, Indians need to feel that
they are receiving respect and being treated as
equals. Indians are sometimes too quick to take
offense in their dealings with foreigners, and
Westerners are well advised to remember this:
Indians have a thin skin. ■
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Unlike companies in neighbouring regions such as the Middle
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